Endogenous (Re-)Distributive Policies and Economic Growth: A Comparative Static Analysis by Rehme, Günther
Darmstadt Discussion Papers 
in Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous (Re-)Distributive Policies and Economic Growth:  
A Comparative Static Analysis 
 
Günther Rehme  
 
 
Nr. 185 
 
 
Arbeitspapiere 
des Instituts für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
Technische Universität Darmstadt 
 
 
ISSN: 1438-2733 
 
 
 
 
 
E conomic T heory 
Endogenous (Re-)Distributive Policies and
Economic Growth: A Comparative Static
Analysis
Gu¨nther Rehme∗
Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt†
May 21, 2007
Abstract
This paper analyzes the interplay of growth, (re-)distribution and poli-
cies when the latter are set exogenously or when the latter depend on
economically important fundamentals. A redistribution policy gen-
erally causes lower growth, but less so when there is technological
progress. The model implies that high (endogenous) tax rates may
not necessarily imply low growth. The paper shows that the long-
run cross-country relationship between growth and endogenous policy
is generally not clear-cut. But this relies on conditions that can be
used for identification in empirical research. The paper also argues
that workers benefit more from technical progress than capital own-
ers, even though inequality might and growth would rise.
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1 Introduction
It is often shown that policies which are optimal for the accumulated factor
of production maximize growth and that high (re-)distributive taxes slow
down long-run growth. See, for instance, Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik
(1994), Bertola (1993) or Persson and Tabellini (1994).
However, when analyzing the effects of policy on growth empirically, pol-
icy is mostly viewed as exogenously determined and in this context it turns
out that - at least across countries - these theoretical predictions do not ap-
pear to command strong empirical support. See, for example, Barro (1991),
Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Perotti (1994), and Sala-i-Martin (1996).1
In this paper I add to these contributions by distinguishing between ex-
ogenous and endogenous policy. The latter is given when policy is set op-
timally and, thus, takes account of fundamental economic variables. Endo-
geneity of policy may help explain why we observe policy-growth relationships
that are sometimes at odds with theory. To make this point I focus on theory
as one step in uncovering what differences exogenous or endogenous policy
may imply for the policy-growth nexus.
For the analysis I concentrate on two policy instruments as metaphors
for wider policy packages that may be analyzed in more general frameworks.
One instrument is a tax rate that may cause a disincentive to accumulate.
The other is an indicator for direct redistribution from the accumulated to
the non-accumulated factor of production. A simplified version of the widely
known model of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) that incorporates features shared
by many other models provides the theoretical ”lens” through which existing
results are interpreted.
In the model taxes can be used to finance productive inputs in produc-
tion as in Barro (1990) or to grant direct transfers to the non-accumulated
1Recent discussions of those issues can be found in Be´nabou (1996), Bertola (1999),
Temple (1999), Aghion, Caroli, and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (1999), and Jovanovic (2000). It
should be noted that some authors argue that growth is invariant to (some) policy (mea-
sures). See, for example, Stokey and Rebelo (1995). On the whole, though, a lot of
historical evidence suggests that growth and development do in fact react to (fundamen-
tal) policy changes, including tax and redistribution policies. See, for instance, Landes
(1998). In this paper I follow the latter evidence.
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factor of production. As is common the accumulated factor of production
is identified with capital and the non-accumulated factor of production with
(unskilled) labour.
First, the model predicts that in equilibrium an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between taxes and growth holds, when taxes are set exogenously.
Taxes higher than those which are optimal for the capital owners imply lower
growth. Furthermore, higher taxes imply higher redistribution from capital
to labour. These results are in line with many other theoretical contributions.
Second, we introduce optimizing governments. By assumption govern-
ments are either only concerned about the workers or only about the capital
owners.2 The optimal policy of an entirely pro-capital government is tanta-
mount to a growth maximizing policy in the model.3 In contrast, an entirely
pro-labour government chooses higher taxes and, thus, lower growth.
In the model all optimal policies depend on three fundamental economic
variables: the rate of time preference, an index of the state of technology
and the (pre-tax) share of capital (income in total income). Thus, policy is
economically endogenous.
Acknowledging that all these factors play a potential role, we concentrate
on the state of technology (aggregate efficiency) as the prime mover of policy
and fix the other determinants for the analysis. This is rationalized by the
importance that aggregate efficiency is usually accorded to in explanations
of long-run changes to the economic structure of a country. See, for example,
Prescott (1998).
Analyzing the consequences of changes in aggregate efficiency the follow-
2This simplifying assumption captures that political preferences may be structurally
fixed one way or the other for a long period of time. For evidence on this see, for ex-
ample, Garrett (1998). Furthermore, the qualitative results would not change if instead
governments attached different social weights on the workers’ or capital owners’ welfare.
3This need not necessarily be the case. For instance, Bertola (1993) shows that indirect
taxes may produce different results. In this context, Rehme (2002a) uses an equivalence
result for direct and indirect taxation to show that under certain conditions the optimal
policy of the non-accumulated factor of production may also maximize growth and imply
higher growth than under the optimal policy for the accumulated factor of production.
However, here we follow the more conventional notion that the owners of the accumulated
factor of production would generally opt for higher growth than the owners of the non-
accumulated factor of production.
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ing results then emerge: When fixing policy at some arbitrary (including
some optimal) level, higher efficiency implies higher growth, but lower re-
distribution. The first result corresponds to conventional wisdom. A bet-
ter technology allows a better use of resources in the accumulation process
and that is reflected in a higher growth rate. The second result is not so
straightforward. In the analysis redistribution is measured in terms of an
arbitrary policy generating a particular after-tax-and-subsidy factor income
distribution relative to the after-tax-and-subsidy factor income distribution
generated under a growth maximizing policy.4
The latter distribution is independent of aggregate efficiency.5 Thus,
the after-tax capital income rises relatively more, when policy is fixed and
efficiency rises. Hence, efficiency gains accrue relatively more to the capital
owners and so redistribution from labour to capital is lower in this case.
These results imply a tradeoff: For given policy, higher efficiency entails
lower redistribution, but higher growth. For given efficiency, taxes higher
than those which are optimal for growth imply lower growth, but more re-
distribution. This suggests that governments could tax the beneficial effects
of higher efficiency away and redistribute more. However, this only holds if
policy is set exogenously.
In the third stage of the analysis, it is acknowledged that policy is eco-
nomically endogenous. Thus, changes in efficiency will have a direct and an
indirect effect on growth and redistribution.
The model then implies that for given political preferences the observed
4Many models on the growth-distribution nexus focus on the factor income distribution.
As has been pointed out by Perotti (1996), these models are difficult to bring to the data.
In defence of concentrating on the factor income distribution - in a theoretical model -
we use the argument that the factor income distribution is of considerable importance
for the distribution of personal incomes. See, for example, Atkinson (1983) and Atkinson
and Bourguignon (2000). Furthermore, this approach has the advantage of seeing clearly,
how policy affects the personal income distribution through the factor income distribution.
That is not always so clear when concentrating on the personal income distribution directly.
5The ratio of pre-tax capital and labour income is independent of efficiency A. However,
the ratio of after-tax incomes depends on the ratio of the tax rate to the wage rate. For
fixed taxes, higher A implies higher wages. Thus, that ratio decreases. Since after-tax
capital income is the pre-tax return on capital minus the (given) tax rate, it follows
that after-tax capital income rises relative to the wage rate. Consequently, redistribution
towards labour decreases in the model.
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association between growth and taxes would be positive within countries.
Thus, even optimizing, entirely pro-labour governments respect the benefi-
cial effects of higher efficiency by not increasing taxes too much.6 The same is
true for redistribution. That implies that a negative relationship between re-
distribution and growth should be observed. This holds if one views changes
in aggregate efficiency over time as capturing the development process in a
particular country with optimizing governments.
The predictions are less clear-cut, when the analysis is applied to a
cross-section of countries. In fact, the observed tax-growth as well as the
redistribution-growth relationships should generally be ambiguous when the
distribution of aggregate efficiency takes on more general forms. It would
still be true that the observed tax-growth relationship is positive, but only
if all countries in a sample would have the same political preferences. That,
of course, is quite unlikely. Thus, no clear prediction on this relationship is
in general possible.7
From the latter result negative implications for cross-country would seem
to be inevitable. For instance, Rodrik (2005) has recently argued that we
learn ”nothing from regressing economic growth on policies.” However, the
present paper allows for a more constructive message. We may simply argue
that there is a need to disentangle more precisely the relationship between
policy and growth, by taking account of the influence of deep variables like
aggregate efficiency, which (possibly) bear on both policy and growth. The-
ory may provide an important guiding tool in this respect.8
In a last step the welfare implication of efficiency changes are analyzed.
Again policy is taken to be endogenous. Interestingly, I find that the individ-
6The intuition for this is that in the long-run the workers benefit more from the in-
tertemporal gain induced by a higher growth rate with relatively lower taxes than by
higher redistribution with relatively higher taxes.
7Furthermore, we might observe that countries operating under pro-labour policies may
have higher growth than those under pro-capital policies. But for this to be the case, the
former countries need to be sufficiently efficient to support such a regime. When one finds
that redistribution and growth are positively associated, then the model attributes this to
sufficient efficiency advantages of pro-labour vis-a-vis pro-capital countries.
8One way to constructively cope with this issue in relation to existing results may,
for instance, be to analyze the problems associated with interpreting estimates in growth
regressions when using theory. For such an approach see, for example, Rehme (2002b).
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ual worker as well as a pro-labour government would never benefit less from
efficiency increases than a capital owner or a pro-capital government. More
efficiency is in the interest of all agents in the model, but - interestingly - the
workers would prefer it relatively more.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and D.3 set up the model
and derive the equilibrium. Sections 4 to 6 presents an analysis of exogenous
policy, introduces optimizing governments and relates policy to economic
fundamentals. Section 7 relates growth to endogenous policy. Section 8
presents the welfare analysis. Section 9 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by two types of many, price-taking and infinitely
lived individuals who are all equally patient. One group of agents, the cap-
italists, owns wealth equally and does not work. The other group is made
up of workers who own (raw) labour equally, but no capital.9 Population
is stationary and consists of l workers and n capitalists of whom there are
less, that is, l > n. Each individual derives logarithmic utility from the con-
sumption of a homogeneous, malleable good.10 Aggregate output is produced
9The assumption uses a short-cut of a result in Bertola (1993). He has shown in an
endogenous growth model that for utility maximizing, infinitely lived agents who do not
own initial capital, it is not optimal to save/invest out of wage income along a long-run,
i.e. steady state, balanced growth path. Similarly, it is not optimal to work for those
who only own capital initially. Thus, the set-up is reminiscent of Kaldor (1956), where
different proportions of profits and wages are saved. However, in Kaldorian models growth
determines factor share incomes, whereas in endogenous growth models the direction is
rather from factor shares to growth.
10This assumption is invoked for two reasons. First, suppose that ex ante, under a
veil of ignorance (see, for instance, Harsanyi (1955)) people face a positive probability of
becoming a worker or a capital owner. This risk must be evaluated by agents who have
to make decisions for their and their offspring’s lifetime income, given that they end up in
some class. For such a scenario Sinn (2003), Robson (2001), Robson (1996) and Sinn and
Weichenrieder (1993) have shown that only those people do best (in a biological selection
process) that evaluate such risky choices by logarithmic utility functions. Thus, the model
concentrates on ”surviving” individuals in a world with risk and uses their (”fittest”)
preferences in a world with certainty. This also justifies why agents may have the same
rate of time preference. The second reason is empirical. Recent evidence indicates that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is in fact close to one. See, for example, Beaudry
and van Wincoop (1996). Thus, these two arguments may justify a set-up with logarithmic
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according to
Yt = AK
α
t G
1−α
t L
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1 (1)
where Yt denotes aggregate output, Kt is the real capital stock, Lt is labour
supplied, and Gt are public inputs to production.
11 Capital is broadly de-
fined and by assumption human capital is strictly complementary to physical
capital.
Thus, in the model capitalists who, for instance, own computers know
how to operate them as well. This eliminates a separate treatment of how
human capital is accumulated and entails that the return on human capital
services equals that of physical capital services in a perfectly competitive
economy. For a justification of such an approach in a different context see
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
The constant efficiency index A reflects the economy’s state of technol-
ogy. It depends on cultural, institutional and technological development and
captures long-run, exogenous factors that play a role in production.
Each worker inelastically supplies 1
l
units of (raw) labour at each point in
time. As there are l workers in the economy, Lt = 1 so that the total labour
endowment equals unity. Furthermore, the model abstracts from problems
arising from the depreciation of the capital stock so that output and factor
returns are really defined in net terms. This has no consequences for the
price-taking, market clearing logic of the model.
2.1 The Public Sector
Following Alesina and Rodrik (1994) we analyze a wealth tax scheme which
is meant to serve as a metaphor capturing the essential features of many
instantaneous utility.
11Like Barro (1990) one may assume that the government owns no capital and that it
buys a flow of output from the private sector and makes it available to the individual firm.
Then public inputs to production would be rival. Alternatively one may assume that total
government expenditure affects private production in a non-rival way. This empirically
relevant distinction does not matter analytically in the model. Note that in the absence
of a government due to civil war or other forms of unrest, the economy would break down
and the agents would starve.
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different sets of (re-)distributive policies.12 The government taxes wealth at
the constant rate τ and transfers a constant share λ of its tax revenues to
the workers. The tax on capital should be viewed as a tax on all resources
that are accumulated, including human capital.
In line with most of the literature on capital taxation the paper abstracts
from the taxation of raw labour. That allows one to focus on the distrib-
utional conflicts between accumulated and non-accumulated factors of pro-
duction.
The government runs a balanced budget under the constraint,
τKt = Gt + λτKt. (2)
Of the tax revenues τKt the workers receive λτKt as transfers and Gt is spent
on public inputs to production.
Thus, the government has two potential instruments for redistribution at
its disposal. First, it can use the tax rate to generate revenue to provide pub-
lic resources in production. This will have an effect on the factor returns in
equilibrium and allows it to change the factor income distribution. Thus, the
tax rate is redistributive in an indirect, and productive sense. Secondly, the
government can raise revenue and directly redistribute these resources to the
non-accumulated factor of production, i.e. workers, when setting λ.13 These
transfers are a direct way of redistributing resources to the workers. The
effects of both instruments are analyzed, because both are used in reality.
12As tax schemes differ widely across countries due to historical, institutional or polit-
ical differences an answer to the question why a society chooses a particular scheme has
to remain outside of this model. For similar arguments and example what redistributive
mechanisms the wealth tax scheme may capture see Alesina and Rodrik’s paper. Fur-
thermore, in the same framework they show that the optimal policies are constant over
time and, thus, time-consistent. For convenience constancy of policy is assumed from the
beginning in this paper.
13As human and physical capital are strict complements by assumption this is a strong
from of redistribution. It implies that if a capital good is given to the workers the corre-
sponding services necessary to operate that good are also given to them. As a one good
economy is contemplated, giving the capital good to the workers for consumption does not
cause a problem.
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2.2 The Private Sector
There are many identical, profit-maximizing firms which operate in a per-
fectly competitive environment. They are owned by the capital owners who
rent capital to and demand shares of the firms. The shares are collateralized
one-to-one by capital. The markets for assets and capital are assumed to
clear at each point in time. The firms take Gt as given, and rent capital
and labour in spot markets in each period. The price of output serves as
nume´raire and is set equal to one. Profit maximization entails that firms pay
each factor of production its marginal product
rt =
∂Yt
∂Kt
= αA
(
Gt
Kt
)1−α
, wt =
∂Yt
∂Lt
= (1− α)A
(
Gt
Kt
)1−α
Kt,
where we have used the normalization Lt = 1,∀t. Substituting for Gt implies
rt = αA[(1− λ)τ ]1−α (3)
wt ≡ η(τ, λ)Kt = (1− α)A[(1− λ)τ ]1−αKt. (4)
Because of the productive role of government services policy has a bearing
on the marginal products. The return on capital is constant over time, while
the wages grow with the capital stock. Notice that higher direct transfers to
the workers (higher λ) lower r and η, while higher taxes raise them. This
is because higher taxes mean that more public resources can be channelled
into production, raising the return to private capital and the wage rate.
In contrast, granting more direct transfers implies that less resources are
available for public inputs in production and, thus, the marginal products
would be lower.
The total wage and transfer income is η(τ, λ)Kt + λτKt. Each worker
receives an equal share of it and derives utility from consuming his entire
income. The representative worker’s intertemporal welfare is given by
∫ ∞
0
ln cWt e
−ρtdt where cWt = (η(τ, λ) + λτ) k˜t, and k˜t ≡
Kt
l
. (5)
Thus, the owners of the non-accumulated factor of production do not invest
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and are not taxed by assumption.
The capitalists choose how much to consume or invest. They have perfect
foresight about the price and tax rate paths, which they take as given. The
representative capital owner maximizes his intertemporal utility according to
max
ckt
∫ ∞
0
ln ckt e
−ρtdt (6)
s.t. k˙t = (r − τ)kt − ckt (7)
k(0) = k0, k(∞) = free, (8)
where kt ≡ Ktn . Equation (7) is the dynamic budget constraint of the capital-
ist which depends on his after-tax income. The growth rate of consumption
and wealth can be calculated in a standard way (see Appendix A) and is
given by
γ ≡ c˙
k
t
ckt
=
k˙t
kt
= (r − τ)− ρ. (9)
Growth is increasing in the after-tax return on capital and constant over
time. Furthermore, from equations (9) and (7), and the usual transversal-
ity condition one verifies that ckt = ρkt is the capitalist’s optimal level of
consumption.14
3 Market Equilibrium.
Constant policies imply constant r and hence constant γ. The economy’s
overall resource constraint implies
It = K˙t = (r − τ)Kt + (η + λτ)Kt − Ckt − CWt . (10)
As the workers’ consumption is CWt = (η+λτ)Kt in the aggregate, this con-
straint is binding, simplifying (10) to K˙t = (r − τ)Kt − Ckt . The capitalists’
consumption Ckt = nc
k
t and wealth Kt = nkt grow at the constant rate γ.
14The derivation of this result is standard for one sector endogenous growth models as
presented here. See e.g. Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995), ch. 4.
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Substitute Gt = (1 − λ)τKt in (1). Recalling Lt = 1 and taking logarithms
and time derivatives yields Y˙t
Yt
= K˙t
Kt
= G˙t
Gt
. Hence, the economy is character-
ized by balanced growth with γ =
c˙kt
ckt
= k˙t
kt
=
˙cWt
cWt
=
C˙kt
Ckt
= K˙t
Kt
=
˙CWt
CWt
= G˙t
Gt
= Y˙t
Yt
where γ = (r − τ)− ρ and r = αA[(1− λ)τ ]1−α.
3.1 (Re-)Distribution
We follow Alesina and Rodrik and call ”redistribution” any policy that dis-
tributes income to the non-accumulated factor of production while reducing
the incentive to accumulate. Thus, they assess income redistribution relative
to growth maximizing policies.15 Such a benchmark for assessing income dis-
tributions may have its virtues when taking into account that people appear
to have difficulties disentangling the relationship between utility enhancing
growth and the distribution of income. See e.g. Amiel and Cowell (1999).
For this paper’s purposes we measure the income dispersion in terms of
the ratio of the factor income of the representative capital owner to the factor
income of the representative worker. For pre-tax (and pre-transfer) incomes
it is given by F g =
rK
n
ηK
l
=
(
α
1−α
) (
l
n
)
. Notice that F g is independent of policy
and the level of technology, A.
For after-tax incomes one gets
F =
(r − τ)K
n
[η + λτ ]K
l
=
(
r − τ
η + λτ
)(
l
n
)
. (11)
Under a growth maximizing policy τˆ = [α(1 − α)A] 1α and λ = 0 so that
rˆ − τˆ = τˆ
(
α
1−α
)
. Furthermore, η = (1− α)Aτˆ 1−α. Thus, the post-tax factor
15In terms of personal income distributions one may ask why those policies should
serve as a benchmark. For example, it may well be the case that moving from a growth
maximizing to some other policy may increase income inequality in personal incomes and
decrease growth. Most people would assess such a redistributing policy shift with reference
to a policy that grants equal incomes per person. This is done in the working paper version
of this paper. See Rehme (2000). However, here redistribution is defined in terms of factor
incomes relative to growth maximizing policies. In particular, it is defined as taking real
resources (wealth) from the owners of the accumulated factor of production by giving them
to the owners of the non-accumulated factor of production in comparison of a situation
where factor incomes are induced by a growth maximizing policy..
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income distribution under that policy is
Fˆ =
 τˆ
(
α
1−α
)
(1− α)Aτˆ 1−α
( l
n
)
=
 τˆα
(
α
1−α
)
(1− α)A
( l
n
)
=
(
α2
1− α
)(
l
n
)
,
which is independent of A. Given this we define ”redistribution” as the
difference between the ratio of the income dispersion F generated under
some policy (τ, λ) in comparison to the income dispersion Fˆ , generated under
growth maximization, in terms of Fˆ . Thus,
Π ≡ Fˆ − F
Fˆ
= 1− F
Fˆ
= 1−
(
r − τ
η + λτ
)(
1− α
α2
)
. (12)
We concentrate on cases where τ ≥ τˆ with possibly λ > 0. Then for any such
τ and λ with τ(1−λ) > τˆ we have (r−τ) ≤ (rˆ− τˆ) and η(τ(1−λ))+λτ > ηˆ.
Thus, F
Fˆ
< 1 and so Π > 0 under such policies, which are the ones we find in
equilibrium. Hence, any increase (decrease) in Π from a situation with Π ≥ 0
means that redistribution increases (decreases). Intuitively, an increase in
redistribution is associated with relatively more income going to the workers
relative to the income going to them under the growth maximizing policy.
4 Exogenous Policy
In this section we analyze the effects of changes in policy on growth and redis-
tribution when policy is set exogenously, that is, when potentially important
economic determinants of policy are ignored when choosing policy.
For the growth rate we have
γ = (r − τ)− ρ = (αA[(1− λ)τ ]1−α − τ)− ρ. (13)
Lemma 1 Given everything else, growth is first increasing and then decreas-
ing in τ and maximized when λ = 0 and τ = τˆ ≡ [α(1 − α)A] 1α . Direct
transfers (λ > 0) to the workers for given taxes imply lower growth.
Thus, if relatively high taxes - for example, for granting direct transfers
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to the workers - are levied, then growth is lower16 when τ ≷ τˆ . For given
taxes, transferring resources to the workers (higher λ) lowers growth, because
these resources will not be used productively and will reduce the marginal
products.
For exogenous policy changes one obtains that the reaction of redistribu-
tion Π in equation (12) depends on the sign of ∂F
∂λ |τ which hinges on
17
l
n
[(rλ − 1)(η + λτ)− (ηλ + λ)(r − τ)]
= rλ · η + rλ · λ · τ − ηλ · r + ηλ · τ − τ · (r − τ).
As rλη = ηλr and rλ, ηλ < 0 it follows that the expression is negative and,
hence, ∂F
∂τ |λ < 0 and so
∂Π
∂τ |λ > 0. Similarly, for the sign of
∂F
∂λ |τ one obtains
l
n
[(rτ − 1)(η + λτ)− (ητ + λ)(r − τ)]
which is also negative.18 Hence, ∂Π
∂λ |τ > 0. But then redistribution Π satisfies
∂Π
∂τ |λ > 0 and
∂Π
∂λ |τ > 0.
Lemma 2 Given everything else, redistribution Π increases, when the direct
transfers λ and/or the tax rate τ are increased.
Thus, there is a monotonic relationship between taxes and redistribution
in the model. In that sense higher tax rates than τˆ always redistribute income
towards the non-accumulated factor of production.
4.1 Implications
If we ignore important determinants of economic policy, the model yields the
following predictions about observable associations between redistribution
16This is because less Gt is available to raise the marginal products when the costs of
financing Gt rise too much. Thus, the optimal G is attained when τ = τˆ and, in terms of
output, the marginal cost of providing public inputs equals their marginal benefit.
17We denote partial derivatives by a subscript from now on. Thus, xA denotes ∂x∂A .
18Notice that [(rτ − 1)(η + λτ)− (ητ + λ)(r − τ)] = rτ · η + rτ · λ · τ − η − λ · τ − ητ ·
r + ητ · τ − λ · r + λ · r where rτ · η = ητ · r. Furthermore, rτ · λ · τ < λ · r and ητ · τ < η.
Thus, the expression for ∂F∂λ |τ is negative.
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and growth on the one hand, and tax rates and growth on the other. In
order to relate to the next sections we focus on tax rates such that τ > τˆ
which capture the conventional wisdom of a negative association between
growth and redistribution, resp. tax rates. The graphs below visualize the
simple relationships and follow straightforwardly from lemma (1) and (2).
Figure 1: Growth and Taxes
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Figure 2: Growth and Redistribution
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Point C in figure (1) and (2) depicts the growth maximizing policy with
τ = τˆ . According to our definition of redistribution point C in figure 2
then implies a situation of no redistribution, that is, Π = 0. An increase in
taxes (or higher λ) means that we move towards point D with lower growth,
but higher redistribution. Thus, the predicted relationship under the as-
sumption that everything else is given also entails that one should observe a
negative relationship between redistribution and growth. Consequently, we
should observe a negative tradeoff between redistribution and growth. For
any empirical analysis for a cross-section of countries this prediction would
hold under the maintained assumption that the countries are structurally
homogeneous and technologically similar.
5 Optimizing Governments
Next, we put structure on policy by introducing optimal behaviour of gov-
ernments. That allows us to identify which policy is chosen by a government
having particular preferences. Concentrating on simple policy determination
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to make the link, we will find that some governments will prefer τˆ as their
optimal choice, while others may prefer higher taxes, τ > τˆ .
To this end consider governments that represent a representative worker
or capital owner.19 The intertemporal welfare of an entirely pro-capital, V r,
resp. entirely pro-labour government, V l, is then given by (see Appendix B)
V r(ckt ) =
ln(ρk0)
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
and V l(cWt ) =
ln
[
(η(τ, λ) + λτ)k˜0
]
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
. (14)
The governments respect the right of private property and maximize the
welfare of their clientele under the condition λ ≥ 0. That restricts the
governments in that even a pro-capital government does not tax workers,
because a negative λ would effectively amount to a tax on wages.
This assumption are invoked for the following reasons: One easily verifies
that an entirely pro-capital government would optimally choose λ such that
the workers would receive zero after-tax-and-transfer income. We rule out
such ’enslavement’ of raw labour, because it is not a viable political option
in most countries - at least not anymore. Furthermore, we rule out expropri-
ation of capital for the governments. Although a command optimum in the
model would involve expropriation of capital even for a government maximiz-
ing the welfare of the capital owners, it is ignored as a policy option because
it is not very common in the real world.
The optimal pro-labour policy is derived in Appendix C and is given by
If ρ ≥ [(1− α)A] 1α then:
τ = ρ, λ = 1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
ρ
. (15)
19This assumption allows to place governments on the traditional ’left’ (pro-worker) -
’right’ (pro-capital) spectrum. The analysis may capture democratic and non-democratic
political regimes. As regards democratic regimes the assumption has the advantage of
transcending the more conventional Downsian approach of political decision making that
relies on a median voter. The Downsian approach can be criticized on various grounds.
The present set-up avoids these criticisms by assuming that political parties, once in power,
adhere to their party platforms. On Downsian approaches and justifications of why the
present set-up is useful see, for instance, Roemer (2001) and Roemer (2006).
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If ρ < [(1− α)A] 1α then:
τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] = ρ(1− α), λ = 0 . (16)
Let τˇ solve these equations. For a wide range of parameter values the pro-
labour government chooses not to grant direct (unproductive) transfers to
the workers in the optimum. In particular, there will be no direct transfers
when the workers are sufficiently patient as in (16). In that case the beneficial
effects of a higher growth rate coupled with relatively lower taxes outweigh
the intertemporal welfare obtained by higher taxes and lower growth when
the workers are relatively impatient. Thus, the agents may trade off higher
consumption now against higher growth and so higher consumption in the
future.
Furthermore, the conditions on the parameters imply that if the govern-
ment grants direct transfers and so chooses a positive λ, then equation (15)
implies (1− λ)τˇ = [(1− α)A] 1α . If Θ ≡ (1− α)A, then
r = αA[(1− λ)τˇ ]1−α = αAΘ 1−αα =
(
α
1− α
)
Θ
1
α .
But τˇ = ρ ≥ Θ 1α in (15), and γ > 0 requires r− τˇ−ρ > 0. So τˇ has to satisfy
τˇ > Θ
1
α ∧
(
α
1− α
)
Θ
1
α > 2τˇ ⇔ τˇ
(
α
1− α
)
Θ
1
α > Θ
1
α 2τˇ ⇔ α > 2
3
.
Thus, direct redistribution through transfers to the workers is only optimal
when the share of capital α is sufficiently higher than that of public inputs
or labour, i.e., when capital receives a relatively high pre-tax share in total
income and consequently factor income inequality is relatively high.
Lemma 3 Positive growth under a policy with direct transfers to the work-
ers, λ > 0, requires α > 2
3
.
Thus, the model captures that direct transfers are optimally called for
when the factor income distribution is very unequal.20 This would correspond
20Notice that we contemplate a model with a broad definition of capital. Then it may
well be the case that α is bigger than 0.5. See e.g. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
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to the conventional wisdom that redistribution policies that are in the interest
of lesser privileged groups have that feature.
In contrast, the pro-capital government chooses
τ = τˆ ≡ [α(1− α)A] 1α and λ = 0. (17)
Thus, the pro-capital government does not directly transfer resources to the
workers and acts growth maximizing in the model by granting the maximum
after-tax return on capital.21
6 Economic Fundamentals and Policy
All the optimal policies derived above (see equations (15), (16), and (17))
depend on three fundamental variables, namely, the state of technology A,
the rate of time preference, ρ, and the share of capital, α. The rate of time
preference is not considered any further, because it is considered a variable
that is hard to measure.22 Most researchers find that there is not much
variability in the capital share, α, over time and across countries.23 For that
reason we will not focus on it either. However, the efficiency index A is of
prime interest in many models of growth and distribution. In this paper we
also take A to be a prime determinant of policy, especially when comparing
21In Appendix C it is also shown that any government that attaches more social weight
on the capitalists’ welfare would choose taxes closer to τˆ leading to higher growth. All the
subsequent results would then hold in relative terms.
22It should be noted, however, that the model would imply an interesting result as
regards patience. Political preferences alone do not rule out the possibility of choosing
a high growth policy. Trivially, but importantly a pro-labour government would mimic
a growth maximizing policy if the workers are very patient, that is, if ρ goes to zero in
equation (16). This is a special, but interesting case. It means that a government which
places maximal weight on the non-accumulated factor of production may act like a growth
maximizer if it puts almost equal weight on the welfare of future generations (low ρ). The
two policies coincide only if ρ→ 0 which causes problems for the convergence of the utility
indices. For any empirical observation, however, it suffices that ρ be very low while the
utility indices still converge. In this case the measured tax and growth rates under an
optimal pro-labour, pro-capital or a growth maximizing policy would be observationally
indistinguishable.
23See e.g. Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), p. 341,
Sachs (1979), Table 3, or more recently Gollin (2002).
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countries. For that reason we will focus on the role of effects of A on policy
and growth in the rest of the paper. Thus, we take policy to be endogenous
by depending on the important economic fundamental A.
This merits a clarifying remark: Many people argue that A is essentially
unobservable. Others find that A is very hard to measure. This is almost
common knowledge in applied work. Without further, sometimes strong
assumptions it is hard to pin down A empirically. Here I will not make these
assumptions. I will simply assume that empirical indicators (or proxies) of A
will produce the same predictions as in this paper, if they are monotonically
related to A and not (directly) under the control of any decision maker. That
various factors may bear on A is precisely what calls for a theory about A.
See, for example, Prescott (1998). But if the theoretical ”lens” provided
by this paper’s model is used, any empirical indicator that is monotonically
related to this model’s A would suffice to support the model’s predictions
and, thus, render them testable. For that reason an analysis of the effects of
(perhaps hard to measure, but conventionally thought to be important) A
on policy and growth should be of sufficient interest.24
6.1 Exogenous Policy and Economic Efficiency
Next, we look at the effects of a change in aggregate efficiency A on growth
and distribution for an arbitrary and a growth maximizing policy. To this
end we fix the policy choices τ and τˆ and look what happens when aggregate
efficiency changes. The arbitrary tax rate may coincide with τ = τˇ , that is,
the optimal policy of an entirely pro-labour government but the results apply
to more general policy choices.
That exercise yields the following: The growth rate in (13) implies that
for given policy an increase in A raises growth and implies an upward shift
of the concave relationship between taxes and growth.
24Notice that in terms of conventional production-function-based explanations the pa-
per implies a simple theory about one determinant of aggregate efficiency, namely that
captured by the influence of productive inputs in production G. The indicator A then
represents the unexplained part of (total) aggregate efficiency in a production function
framework as in, for instance, Hall and Jones (1999). However, formulating a detailed
theory about A is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Lemma 4 An increase in efficiency raises growth for given policy.
The result that a more efficient economy has higher growth corresponds
to common economic intuition. The important point here is that this re-
sult holds for given policy. Since higher taxes, when set exogenously, imply
lower growth, there is an interesting trade-off between the effect of taxes or
efficiency on growth.
Next, we look at redistribution. Clearly, under the growth maximizing
policy Π = 0 and is independent of A. For other policies we obtain that the
sign of ∂Π
∂A
depends on the sign of ∂F
∂A
and, thus, on
rA · (η + λτ)− ηA · (r − τ) = rA · η + rA · λ · τ − ηA · r + ηA · τ. (18)
One verifies that ηAr = ηAr and rA, ηA > 0 for given policy (τ, λ) so that the
expression in (18) is positive. Thus,
Lemma 5 If there is redistribution, Π > 0, an increase in efficiency A for
given policy reduces redistribution, i.e. ∂Π
∂A
< 0. Under a growth maximizing
policy, Π = 0, a change in efficiency does not have any effect on redistribu-
tion.
The reason for this interesting, rather surprising result is the following:
Higher efficiency raises both the pre-tax return on capital and pre-tax wages,
but the relative change would be the same for both types of income and so
rk/ηk does not change at all. In turn, the relative change would be different
for the after-tax incomes. The relative tax burden borne by the accumulated
factor of production, τk/rk, would fall for a given policy. As r = α/(1−α)η,
the relative tax burden in terms of the wage rate would also fall. Then
the relative income gain induced by higher efficiency accrues relatively more
to the capital owners. Thus, when holding policy constant, the capitalists’
after-tax income rises by relatively more than the workers’ post-tax income.
Hence, for given policy relatively more income would be distributed towards
capital when aggregate efficiency rises.
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6.2 Implications
Lemma (1), (2), (4) and (5) imply for given policies with τ > τˆ that there
is an interesting tradeoff between between policy and economic efficiency.
For a given level of efficiency higher taxes reduce growth and imply more
redistribution, whereas for given policy an increase in efficiency raises growth
and implies lower redistribution.
This suggests that for empirical analyses that across countries the associ-
ation between taxes and growth may not be clear-cut. For example, we may
observe countries with high tax rates, but coupled with high efficiency these
countries may also feature relatively high growth.
In contrast, in a cross-section of countries the association between redis-
tribution and growth is likely to be observed to be negative. However, this
will crucially depend on the levels of the tax rates and economic efficiency.
7 Endogenous Policy and Growth
Now we relax the previous assumption that τˇ and τˆ are fixed and expressly
allow the optimal tax rates to vary in response to changes in aggregate effi-
ciency A. To this end we consider the policy choices for entirely pro-labour
and entirely pro-capital policies as given in equations (15), (16), and (17).
The relationship between tax rates and growth as well as between redistri-
bution and growth under the optimal pro-capital or pro-labour policies will
be analyzed in turn.
7.1 Endogenous taxes and growth
For the optimal pro-capital policy one easily verifies from equation (17) that
dτˆ
dA
> 0. Thus, the optimal tax rate would higher under that policy.
Furthermore, the maximum after-tax return, rˆ−τˆ = τˆ
(
α
1−α
)
, is increasing
in A since d(rˆ−τˆ)
dA
=
(
α
1−α
)
dτˆ
dA
. Hence, dγˆ
dA
> 0 as well. Thus, an increase in
efficiency raises the maximum after-tax return, the growth maximizing tax
rate and maximum growth under the optimal pro-capital policy.
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Next, turn to a pro-labour government that does not directly transfer
resources to the workers, λ = 0. The effect of an increase in A on optimal
taxes in (16) is
(
1− α(1− α)2Aτ−α
)
dτ −
(
α(1− α)τ 1−α
)
dA = 0
dτ
dA
= α(1− α)τ
(
τα − α(1− α)2A
)−1
. (19)
As τˇ > τˆ , the expression is positive.25 Hence, an increase in efficiency makes
a non-redistributing, pro-labour government increase its optimal tax rate.
Next, dγ
dA
= rA + (rτ − 1) dτdA > 0 if
ατ 1−α >
(
1− α(1− α)Aτ−α
) [
α(1− α)τ
(
τα − α(1− α)2A
)−1]
τα − α2(1− α)2A > (1− α)τα − α2(1− α)2A
which is equivalent to 1 > 1− α and true. Thus, dγˇ
dA
> 0 if λ = 0 in (16).
Suppose the government chooses positive direct transfers to the workers.
Then equation (15) implies dτˇ
dA
= 0 and dλˇ
dA
< 0. Then dγ
dA
= rA + rλ
dλ
dA
> 0
since rλ < 0 and rA > 0.
Proposition 1 The optimal policies of a pro-capital or pro-labour govern-
ment imply that higher efficiency leads them to choose either higher taxes
when λ = 0 or the same taxes and lower transfers. An increase in efficiency
leads to higher growth under the optimal pro-capital and pro-labour policy.
Hence the beneficial effect of public resources is enhanced when economies
are more efficient. This is taken account of when government choose their
optimal policies. Thus, the beneficial effect of higher efficiency is not coun-
teracted by choosing taxes so that growth is reduced. In that sense there
is a tradeoff between taxes and efficiency which is solved in the optimum so
that the beneficial effects of higher efficiency are maintained. Observation-
ally it would imply that in a cross-section of countries we would observe that
25To see this notice that dτdA > 0 requires τ
α > α(1 − α)2A which is equivalent to
τ > τˆ(1− α) 1α and always satisfied since τˇ > τˆ and (1− α) 1α < 1.
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more efficient counties would choose higher taxes, but would also have higher
growth.
7.2 Endogenous redistribution and growth
Clearly, under the pro-capital policy Π = 0 which is independent of aggregate
efficiency A. Under the pro-labour policy, in contrast, we obtain the following
expressions for redistribution, Π = 1− Fˇ
Fˆ
:26
Π|λ=0 = 1− 1
α
(
1− τˇ
α
αA
)
and Π|λ>0 = 1− 1
α
 [(1− α)A] 1α
ρ
− 1− α
α
 .
Clearly,
dΠ|λ>0
dA
< 0. For
dΠ|λ=0
dA
it suffices to check whether τˇ
α
αA
is increasing
or decreasing in A. The reaction of this term depends on the sign of
ατˇα−1
dτˇ
dA
αA− ατˇα
which is negative from equation (19) since dτˇ
dA
< τˇ
αA
is equivalent to
α(1− α)τˇ
(
τˇα − α(1− α)2A
)−1
<
τˇ
αA
⇔ α(1− α)A < τˇα
and true, because τˆα = α(1− α)A and τˇ > τˆ . Hence, dΠ|λ=0
dA
< 0.
Proposition 2 When policy is endogenous and political preferences are fixed,
an increase in efficiency leads to higher taxes but generally does not imply
more and sometimes implies less redistribution.
Thus, the two counteracting effects of taxes and efficiency are such that
the effect of efficiency dominates are regards redistribution. That means
that according to the model no optimizing governments - not even optimizing,
26For this notice that Fˇ
Fˆ
when λ = 0 boils down to Fˇ
Fˆ
=
(
rˇ−τˇ
ηˇ
) (
1−α
α2
)
which reduces
to Π|λ=0 since rˇ = αAτˇ1−α and ηˇ = (1 − α)Aτˇ1−α. For FˇFˆ when λ > 0 notice that Fˇ =(
rˇ−τˇ
ηˇ+λˇτˇ
)
. But ηˇ+ λˇτˇ = (1−α)A[τˇ(1− λˇ)]1−α+ λˇτˇ as well as τˇ = ρ and λ = 1− [(1−α)A]
1
α
ρ .
Thus, ηˇ+ λˇτˇ = (1−α)A[(1−α)A] 1α−1+ρ− [(1−α)A] 1α = ρ. Substituting in 1− Fˇ
Fˆ
yields
the expression for Π|λ>0.
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strictly pro-labour governments - would ever choose a policy that counteracts
the positive effect of higher efficiency on growth. Even governments that like
redistribution would not sacrifice the beneficial effect of higher growth on
intertemporal welfare by increasing taxes too much, when efficiency increases.
7.3 Implications
Proposition (1) and (2) have important consequences for empirical work.
Suppose we have data on taxes, redistribution and growth for a cross-section
of countries. The efficiency index A is very hard to observe and many as-
sumptions have to be made to measure it. Thus, suppose we do not have
data on A. But we know that A has an impact on growth and policy. Then
the model implies the following for observable policy variables:
The possible combinations of (observable) tax rate and growth combina-
tions are depicted in figure (3). For countries that experience an increase in
efficiency and given the optimal policy of a pro-capital or pro-labour govern-
ment we see that for each of them separately we would observe a positive
association between taxes and growth. For instance, comparing pro-capital
policies under C or C’ yields that the C’ country would feature higher taxes
and higher growth in comparison to the C country. The same holds for the
optimal pro-labour policies when comparing D with D’ or D”. Thus, when
political preferences are structurally fixed for long periods of time27 and, in
the course of development, A increases over time, then - in contrast to the
assumption that policy is set exogenously - we would observe that within
countries the association between tax rates and growth is positive.28
27Evidence for this for OECD countries can be found in, for example, Garrett (1998).
28This is in contrast to the prediction that higher taxes generally entail lower growth.
Of course, that prediction was derived under the assumption that all countries have the
same technology and policy is set exogenously.
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Figure 3: Growth and Endogenous Taxes
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However, in a sample with countries where pro-labour or pro-capital poli-
cies are pursued this would not hold anymore. Suppose we take each point
as reflecting some countries that are technologically similar. For instance, D
may represent a set of countries that pursue pro-labour policies all sharing
the same efficiency, let us say, A1. When comparing these countries with
those pursuing pro-capital policies at C’ with A2 and A2 > A1, then the
observed relationship is likely to be negative. Thus, in a cross-section one
would have to know the distribution of A and of the political preferences.
Otherwise, no clear prediction would be possible.29
Furthermore, no clear relationship between redistribution and economic
growth can be ascertained. This can be gleaned from figure (4).
29Clearer predictions are possible when additional assumptions are made. For instance,
in Rehme (2006b), or Rehme (2006a) it is found that when countries are exposed to the
danger of capital outflows in a world where capital is internationally highly mobile, then
pro-labour governments would not find it optimal to choose a point such a D′′. Thus,
when a positive association between high, redistributive tax rates and growth is observed
across countries, then it is likely that we have no countries in C ′, some countries that are
in C and some other ones that are in D′.
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Figure 4: Growth and Endogenous Redistribution
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For countries with the same political preferences either no relationship
between growth and redistribution can be established when e.g. comparing C
and C’ for pro-capital policies, or the observed relationship would be negative
for pro-labour policies, when comparing D and D’.
However, we may also observe a positive relationship, when one has a
sample of countries, where one set belongs to C and the other one to D’. In
this case the redistributing countries at D’ would have to be sufficiently more
efficient than the pro-capital countries at C.30
Again it would be necessary to know the distribution of efficiency and of
political preferences across countries and/or over time.
Proposition 3 When growth and policy both depend on economically im-
portant fundamentals so that policy is economically endogenous, no clear re-
lationship between policy and growth can in general be found by empirical
analyses unless information on the distribution of these fundamentals across
countries or over time is known.
The application of this result will apply to almost any model that relates
policy and growth to economic fundamentals when introducing optimizing
behaviour of governments. This would seem like a rather negative result for
30This may indeed be the situation that is found in some empirical studies which find a
positive association between growth and redistribution.
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empirical cross-section research.31
However, the ambiguity of the policy-growth relationships resulting from
differences in aggregate efficiency can in principle be resolved, once endo-
geneity of policy is explicitly acknowledged, and analyzed in detail, and the
corresponding results are used to investigate the growth-policy nexus. Thus,
the result may rather be a constructive one.
If one constructs good measures of A and for policy preferences, we can
use theory to improve on existing empirical research on the policy-growth
nexus. This should be doable. Thus, potential improvements should essen-
tially be possible. In that sense the paper may be taken to convey a ”good”
message for empirical research.
8 Welfare
As a better technology affects long-run growth and policy under the optimal
policies, this will also have an impact on welfare.32 Thus, it is an interesting
question what the relative, overall welfare implications of changes in A in a
model with distributional conflict are.
From (14) one verifies that 0 < dV
r
dA |τˆ <
dV l
dA |τˇ . See Appendix D. Thus, in
the model an advance in technology would benefit a pro-labour government
relatively more in the long run than a pro-capital government.
Proposition 4 Governments that represent the non-accumulated factor of
production only and that wish to redistribute resources from the accumulated
to the non-accumulated factor of production have a relatively greater incen-
tive in the long run to have an economy with a superior technology than
31For instance, it would lend some support to the recent arguments presented by Rodrik
(2005), who shows that by means of conventional growth regression no clear relationship
between policy and growth can in principle to uncovered. It would also support the argu-
ment put forth in, for example, Rehme (2002b) that the estimated coefficients in growth
regressions relating growth and policy variables would in general be biased. Although the
biases can be signed from theory, it would be difficult, but it would in principle be still
possible to interpret existing empirical results or correct for the biases in applied work.
32Most of this section’s results generalize to utility functions of the constant intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution type (CIES). A proof for this can be found in the addendum
at the end of this paper.
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governments representing the accumulated factor of production only.
The result suggests interesting long-run consequences of the effects of
e.g. institutional reform on growth and welfare. Of course, things may be
different in the short run when workers might have to learn new technolo-
gies or there is resistance to reform. For models studying these issues see
e.g. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Helpman and Rangel (1999) or Canton,
de Groot, and Nahuis (1999).
It is important to notice that Proposition 4 applies to governments. For
given optimal policies the worker’s or capital owner’s welfare may react dif-
ferently to changes in A. In this context Appendix D also shows the following
Proposition 5 For given, optimal pro-capital or pro-labour policies the work-
ers never benefit less from technical progress in the long run than the capital
owners. Unless the pro-labour policy redistributes wealth, the workers benefit
relatively more than the capital owners.
That result allows for various interpretations. For instance, if the workers
benefit relatively more from technical progress in the long run than the capital
owners, they should be relatively more interested in innovations and should
be willing to pay a higher (shadow) price for it. Such prices may, for instance,
have to be paid for short-run (in the model pre-t0) phenomena such as the
pain to learn new technologies, short-run unemployment or any - perhaps -
adverse effects on the income distribution.
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a theoretical analysis to investigate the long-run rela-
tionship between public policies and growth. Within a framework that shares
common features with many models it is shown that optimizing governments
take account of fundamental economic variables when making their decisions.
Thus, the paper focuses on endogenous policy.
It is shown that changes of fundamental economic variables have inter-
esting effects on policies and through the latter on the growth rate and the
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income distribution. Several findings of the paper are noteworthy.
The effects of policy on growth are often different when policy is taken to
be exogenous or endogenous. In the model there is a trade-off between higher,
exogenously set taxes and economic efficiency. Given efficiency, higher taxes
may reduce growth, but imply more redistribution. For given taxes, higher
efficiency implies higher growth, but less redistribution.
When governments optimize and, thus, policy becomes endogenous, it
turns out that no optimizing government would tax the beneficial effects of
higher efficiency away. For given political preferences, though, the observed
relationship between taxes and growth should be positive, and that between
redistribution and growth should be negative.
However, the model’s predictions have ambiguous implications for any
cross-section analysis. The paper implies that it would be necessary - proba-
bly based on theory - to disentangle in more detail the relationship between
policy and economic fundamentals as well as growth. This paper has made
a move in that direction extending.
Another noteworthy result of the paper concerns welfare. An increase
in technological efficiency generally raises taxes and growth, given particular
political preferences. But higher efficiency also raises the agents’ welfare
under the optimal policies considered. Interestingly, the relative welfare gains
are found to be often higher for the workers and always higher for a pro-
labour government. Thus, workers may have a greater incentive that their
economies be efficient.
Several caveats apply. Obviously, economic growth is influenced by many
things. This paper simply argues that analyzing the long-run interplay of
fundamental economic variables and public policy may provide useful in-
sights about differences in growth and distribution experiences within or
across countries. In this context, an empirical analysis of the present paper’s
predictions appears to be called for, but has been beyond the scope of this
paper, and will be taken up in future research.
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A The Capital Owners’ Optimum
The necessary first order conditions for the maximization problem are given by
equations (7), (8) and
1
ckt
− µt = 0 (A1a)
µ˙t = µtρ− µt (r − τ) (A1b)
lim
t→∞ ktµte
−ρt = 0. (A1c)
where µt is a positive co-state variable. From equation (A1a), (A1b) it follows that
c˙kt
ckt
= (r−τ)−ρ. Furthermore, for constant τ and from the transversality condition
(A1c) and the budget constraint (7) it follows that c
k
t
ckt
= k˙tkt . Thus, γ =
ckt
ckt
= k˙tkt .
B Welfare
The agents’ welfare is V r =
∫ t
0 ln c
k
t e
−ρt and V l =
∫ t
0 ln c
W
t e
−ρt. Let t → ∞ and
use integration by parts. For this define v2 = ln c
j
t , dv1 = e
−ρtdt where j = k,W .
Recall that dv2 =
˙
cjt
cjt
= γ for j = k,W and constant in steady state. Then
v1 = −1ρ e−ρt so that∫ ∞
0
ln cjt e
−ρt dt =
1
ρ
[
− ln cjt e−ρt
]∞
0
+
1
ρ
∫ ∞
0
γ e−ρt dt
=
ln cj0
ρ
− 1
ρ2
[
γ e−ρt
]∞
0
where ck0 = ρk0 and c
W
0 = (η + λτ)k˜0. Evaluation at the particular limits yields
the expressions in (14).
C Optimal Policies
The government solves: max
τ,λ
(1 − β)V r + β V l s.t. λ ≥ 0 where β is the social
weight attached to each group’s welfare. The FOCs are
β
ητ + λ
(η + λτ)ρ
+
γτ
ρ2
= 0 , λ
(
β
ηλ + τ
(η + λτ)ρ
+
γλ
ρ2
)
= 0.
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Notice that γτ must be negative for the first equation to hold, so in the optimum
τ > τˆ . Concentrating on an interior solution for λ, simplifying, rearranging and
division of the resulting two equations by one another yields
ητ + λ
ηλ + τ
=
γτ
γλ
. (C1)
Then γλ = rλ and γτ = rτ − 1 imply (ητ + λ)rλ = (ηλ + τ)(rτ − 1) which upon
multiplying out becomes ητrλ+λrλ = rτηλ+ rττ −ηλ− τ. Notice rλητ = rτηλ and
η = 1−αα r. Then λrλ = rττ − 1−αα rλ − τ and so(
λ+
1− α
α
)
rλ = τrτ − τ ⇔
(
λ+
1− α
α
)
=
τrτ
rλ
− τ
rλ
.
Recall rτ = αE(1 − λ), rλ = αE(−τ) where E = (1 − α)A[(1 − λ)τ ]−α. Thus,
τrτ
rλ
= − ταE(1−λ)αEτ = −(1− λ) and λ+ (1− λ) + 1−αα = − τrλ ⇔
rλ
α = −τ and so
τ =
[(1− α)A] 1α
1− λ . (C2)
Notice that for this τ we have E = 1. For the first order condition for τ we
note that η = (1 − α)A[(1 − λ)τ ]1−α = E[(1 − λ)τ ] = [(1 − α)A] 1α . Furthermore,
ητ = (1− α)(1− λ), rτ = α(1− λ). Eqn. (C2) implies λ = 1− [(1−α)A]
1
α
τ so that
η + λτ = [(1− α)A] 1α + τ
(
1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
τ
)
= τ.
Then the first order condition for τ becomes
β
ητ + λ
(η + λτ)
= −γτ
ρ
⇔ ητ + λ
τ
= − γτ
βρ
⇔ ητ + λ
γτ
= − τ
βρ
.
But from above ητ+λγτ =
(1−α)(1−λ)+λ
α(1−λ)−1 = −1 so that τ = βρ. Thus,
τ = βρ and λ = 1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
βρ
. (C3)
which is equation (15) when β = 1. Recall that these equations hold for λ ≥ 0,
thus for βρ ≥ [(1− α)A] 1α .
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Suppose λ = 0, then the first order condition becomes
ητ
η
= −rτ − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)E
τE
= −αE − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)βρ = τ − ατE
so that the solution with λ = 0 is given by
(1− α)βρ = τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] (C4)
which holds only if βρ < [(1− α)A] 1α . For β = 1 this is equation (16) in the text.
If β = 0 it follows that λ = 0, γτ = rτ −1 = 0 and τ = τˆ . Thus, the pro-capital
government acts growth maximizing in the model.
Lemma γ(τ) is inversely related to β.
Proof: γτ < 0 for τˇ > τˆ in (15) and (16). Also γ(τ) = αA ((1− λ)τ)1−α − τ − ρ.
Clearly, if λ > 0, then dτˇdβ > 0 in (C3), and (1− λ)τ = [(1− α)A]
1
α . Thus, dγdβ < 0.
Suppose β > 0 and λ = 0. Then τˇ is given as in (C4) so that by the implicit
function theorem dτˇdβ > 0. Thus,
dγ
dβ = γτ
dτˇ
dβ < 0 which proves the lemma.
D Technology Effects on Welfare
Under the optimal policies the welfare in (14) is given by V i(A, τ(A), λ(A)) where
i = l, r. An increase in A changes welfare by
dV i =
∂V i
∂A
dA+
∂V i
∂τ
∂τ
∂A
dA+
∂V i
∂λ
∂λ
∂A
dA.
By the envelope theorem ∂V
r
∂τ = 0 under the optimal pro-capital policy and
∂V l
∂τ =
∂V l
∂λ = 0 under the optimal pro-labour policy. Thus,
dV r
dA |τˆ
=
∂γˆ
∂A |τˆ
(
1
ρ2
)
and
dV l
dA |τˇ ,λ
=
∂(η + λτˇ)
∂A |τˇ ,λ
(
1
(η + λτˇ)ρ
)
+
∂γˇ
∂A |τˇ ,λ
(
1
ρ2
)
.
Notice that under the optimal pro-labour policy (η + λτˇ) = ρ when λ > 0 and
∂η
∂A |τˇ ,λ=0
(
1
ηρ
)
> 0 when λ = 0. But ∂γˆ∂A |τˆ = ατˆ
1−α < ∂γˇ∂A |τˇ ,λ = ατˇ
1−α because
τˇ > τˆ . Hence, 0 < dV
r
dA |τˆ <
dV l
dA |τˇ ,λ so that a government representing the average
worker benefits relatively more than a government representing the average capital
owner.
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Quite another question is how each individual’s welfare is affected by a change
in A given the optimal policies. For instance, under the optimal pro-capital policy
an increase in A implies dV
r
dA |τˆ =
∂γ
∂A
1
ρ2
for a capital owner. For the worker it
implies
dV l
dA |τˆ
=
∂V l
∂A
+
∂V l
∂τ
∂τ
∂A
=
(
∂η
∂A
+
∂η
∂τ
∂τ
∂A
)
1
ηρ
+
(
∂γ
∂A
+
∂γ
∂τ
∂τ
∂A
)
1
ρ2
.
When τ = τˆ none of these derivatives is negative so that dV
r
dA |τˆ <
dV l
dA |τˆ and a
worker benefits more from technical progress than a capital owner under a pro-
capital policy.
Under the optimal λ = 0, pro-labour policy and using the envelope theorem
the welfare changes are
dV r
dA |τˇ
=
(
∂γ
∂A
+
∂γ
∂τ
∂τ
∂A
)
1
ρ2
and
dV l
dA |τˇ
=
∂η
∂A
1
ηρ
+
∂γ
∂A
1
ρ2
.
As ∂γ∂τ < 0 and
∂τ
∂A > 0 when τ = τˇ it follows that
dV r
dA |τˇ <
dV l
dA |τˇ .
Under a λ > 0, pro-capital policy (η+λτˇ) = ρ so that changes in A only affect
γ in V i in (14). But then dV
r
dA |τˇ ,λ =
dV l
dA |τˇ ,λ and the workers and capital owners
would benefit equally.
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Addendum
In this addendum I show that the welfare and the most important comparative static
results of the paper generally carry over when employing the general class of constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility functions.
The set-up is same as in the paper. In particular, everything up to the first part of
section 5.2 is identical.
D.1 Capitalists
The representative capital owner maximizes his intertemporal utility according to
max
ckt
∫ ∞
0
(ckt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt, σ > 0 (1)
s.t. k˙t = (r − τ)kt − ckt (2)
k(0) = k0, k(∞) = free, (3)
where kt ≡ Ktn denotes the capital stock per capital owner and ν ≡ 1σ denotes the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution. The growth rate of consumption and wealth is
given by
γ ≡ c˙
k
t
ckt
=
k˙t
kt
=
(r − τ)− ρ
σ
. (4)
Furthermore, from equations (9) and (7), and the usual transversality condition one verifies
that ckt = (r − γ)kt with ckt = ck0eγt is the capitalist’s optimal level of consumption.
D.2 Workers
The representative worker’s intertemporal welfare is given by∫ ∞
0
(cWt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt where σ > 0, (5)
cWt = (η(τ, λ) + λτ) k˜t, and k˜t ≡
Kt
l
denotes the capital stock per worker and ν ≡ 1σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
D.3 Market Equilibrium.
The market equilibrium is the same as in the paper with balanced growth at γ = c˙
k
t
ckt
=
k˙t
kt
=
˙cWt
cWt
= C˙
k
t
Ckt
= K˙tKt =
˙CWt
CWt
= G˙tGt =
Y˙t
Yt
where γ = (r−τ)−ρσ and r = αA[(1− λ)τ ]1−α.
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D.4 Optimizing Governments
Again assume that the governments are entirely pro-labour or pro-capital. The welfare
function of a worker and capitalist in (1) and (5) in equilibrium satisfies
W i(0) =
∫ ∞
0
(cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt where i = k,W (6)
ct = ci0e
γt and γ =
(r − τ)− ρ
σ
.
Let (r − τ) ≡ R denote the after tax return for the rest of the analysis. Then one readily
verifies that W i(0) integrates to33
W i(0) =
(ci0)
1−σ
(1− σ)(ρ− (1− σ)γ) −
1
ρ(1− σ) , where i = k,W (7)
and we assume that ρ > (1 − σ)γ for the integral to converge. (If σ = 1, then W i(0) =
ln ci0
ρ +
γ
ρ2 .)
Now for ci0 with i =W,k we have for the workers that
cW0 = ηk˜0, where k˜0 ≡
K0
l
. (8)
For the capitalists we get34
ck0 = (R− γ)k0 =
(
R− R− ρ
σ
)
k0 =
(
σ − 1
σ
R+
ρ
σ
)
k0 (9)
where k0 ≡ K0n .
Now let the governments optimize. For simplicity I will ignore the choice of λ. Thus,
I set it equal to zero. Optimality for the choice of τ requires that
(1− σ)2(ci0)−σ
(
∂ci0
∂τ
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) + (1− σ)2
(
∂γ
∂τ
)
(ci0)
1−σ
(1− σ)2(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 = 0
33To see this notice that cit = c
i
0e
γt and γ = R−ρσ imply∫ ∞
0
(cit)
1−σ − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
(ci0 e
γt)1−σ − 1
1− σ e
−ρtdt
=
(ci0)
1−σ
1− σ
∫ ∞
0
e(1−σ)γt e−ρtdt−
∫ ∞
0
1
1− σ e
−ρtdt
Thus, we obtain
W i(0) =
(ci0)
1−σ
1− σ
∫ ∞
0
e[(1−σ)γ−ρ]tdt− 1
ρ(1− σ) .
Integrating and evaluating at the particular limits yields equation (7).
34Note that ρ > (1− σ)γ ⇔ ρ > (1− σ)R, ensuring ck0 > 0.
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(ci0)
1−σ
[(
∂ci0
∂τ
1
ci0
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂τ
)]
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 = 0 (10)(
∂ci0
∂τ
1
ci0
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) + ∂γ
∂τ
= 0. (11)
Now for the two groups this implies
∂cW0
∂τ
= ητ k˜0 = (1− α)2Aτ−αk˜0 and ∂c
k
0
∂τ
= (Rτ − γτ )k0 =
(
σ − 1
σ
)
Rτk0.
We will concentrate on optimal tax rates that induce non-negative after-tax returns. So
we rule out tax rates such that (r − τ) < 0.
The Pro-Capital Government
As Rτ = rτ − 1, one easily verifies that the pro-capital government will set τ so that
Rτ = 0 and γτ = 0, that is, τ = τˆ . Thus, it chooses the growth maximizing tax rate
τˆ = [α(1− α)A] 1α . We know that dτˆdA = τˆαA > 0.
The Pro-Labour Government
As ∂c
W
0
∂τ > 0 for all τ > 0, I find that γτ must be negative in the second term of the
numerator in (11). But then the optimal policy of a pro-labour government is such that
τ > τˆ . In fact, the solution satisfies
ητ
η
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) + γτ = 0. (12)
As ητη =
1−α
τ and γτ =
rτ−1
σ we can multiply through by τ to obtain
(1− α)(ρ− (1− σ)γ) + rτ · τ − τ
σ
= 0
Noticing that r = αAτ1−α we get rτ · τ = (1− α)αAτ−α · τ = (1− α)r. Then
ρ+
r
σ
= (1− σ)
(
r − τ − ρ
σ
)
+
τ
σ(1− α)
ρ+
r
σ
=
(1− σ)r
σ
− (1− σ)τ
σ
− (1− σ)ρ
σ
+
τ
σ(1− α)
ρσ + r = (1− σ)r − (1− σ)τ − (1− σ)ρ+ τ
1− α
ρ(1− α) + σ(1− α)r = [1− (1− σ)(1− α)] τ. (13)
This can be written more compactly as
ρ(1− α) = [[1− (1− σ)(1− α)]− σ(1− α)αAτa] τ
and yields the same solution as in the log case when σ = 1. Let τˇ denote the solution to
this equation.
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For the comparative static results we rearrange (13) to get
ρ(1− α) + σ(1− α)[r − τ ] = (1− (1− α))τ
ρ(1− α) + σ(1− α)[r − τ ] = α τ. (14)
For the change in τ due to a change in A we implicitly differentiate the last expression
σ(1− α)[rτ − 1]dτ + σ(1− α)rAdA = α dτ
[σ(1− α)[rτ − 1]− α] dτ + σ(1− α)rAdA = 0.
Thus, we obtain
dτˇ
dA
= − σ(1− α)rA
σ(1− α)[rτ − 1]− α > 0 (15)
since the denominator is negative evaluated at τˇ > τˆ and rτ < 1 when τ = τˇ .
Furthermore, one easily verifies that a change in σ raises τˇ , in particular, we have
dτˇ
dσ
= − (1− α)(r − τ)
σ(1− α)[rτ − 1]− α > 0. (16)
Thus, a lower elasticity of substitution (higher σ) implies higher taxes under the optimal
pro-labour policy.
E Welfare Analysis
We denote by τˆ the optimal policy for the pro-capital government and τˇ for the pro-labour
government. In any optimum we have
τˆ = [α(1− α)A] 1α and τˇ = ψ(α,A, ρ, σ) (1)
where τˇ > τˆ and τˆdA > 0 and
τˇ
dA > 0.
Thus, policy is endogenous and depends on economic fundamentals. I will not analyze
the exact properties of the optimal pro-labour policies any further here. As before we only
concentrate on the relative welfare effects of aggregate efficiency. To this end, we fix α, ρ,
and σ.
We ask what will happen to the welfare of a worker relative to that of a
capitalist if aggregate efficiency rises.
Given the optimal policies and their effect on the marginal products and returns, we
now evaluate the welfare functions at the optimal policies. Thus,
W i
∗
(0) =W i(α,A, ρ, σ) =
(ci
∗
0 )
1−σ
(1− σ)(ρ− (1− σ)γ∗) −
1
ρ(1− σ) , (2)
where i = k,W and the superscript ∗ denotes variables that are evaluated at the optimal
policies. These, as we recall, are either pro-labour or pro-capital.
As the last term in the welfare function in (2) is the same constant for capitalists and
workers, any comparison between welfare is not affected if we define a transformed welfare
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function
V i
∗
=W i
∗
+
1
ρ(1− σ) =
(ci
∗
0 )
1−σ
(1− σ)(ρ− (1− σ)γ∗) (3)
with i = k,W . V i
∗
ranks welfare in the same way as W i
∗
except that the origin of
comparison for both groups of agents has been moved by the same number. Notice that
the constant term 1ρ(1−σ) does not play a role when finding the optimal policies. Thus,
it does not feature in them. Hence, choosing policies using V i or W i yields the same
solutions.
Next, we establish conditions under which the welfare of a worker is less than that of
a capitalist. To this end we look at the difference in welfare, denoted by ∆, and obtain by
equation (3)
∆ ≡ VW∗ − V k∗ = (c
W
0 )
1−σ − (ck0)1−σ
(1− σ)(ρ− (1− σ)γ) (4)
The condition for ∆ < 0 boils down to cW∗0 < c
k∗
0 and is true
35, if
η∗k˜0 < (R∗ − γ∗)k0 ⇔ n
l
<
R∗ − γ∗
η∗
.
The first inequality says that the condition is satisfied if the wage income of a (low skilled)
worker is less than the income that the capitalist uses for his consumption. This is made
up of the after tax income R∗k0 minus his investment outlays γk0. If the inequality did
not hold, there would be an incentive compatibility problem, because the capitalists might
just sell their entire wealth and become a worker and be better off. We rule this out since
it appears implausible. The second inequality implies that the capitalists are relatively
better off, if the number of (low skilled) workers is sufficiently large. This seems a rather
mild assumption to make and might reflect the situation in, for instance, not so developed
countries. Thus, I will make that assumption for what is to follow.
Assumption 1 There is a sufficiently large number of workers in the economy, that is,
n
l
<
R∗ − γ∗
η∗
.
35Notice that V i∗ is a positive number if σ < 1, and it is a negative number when σ > 1.
If σ < 1, then ∆ < 0 follows immediately when ck0 > c
W
0 . If σ > 0, then ∆ < 0 is satisfied
when
(cW0 )
1−σ − (ck0)1−σ
(1− σ)(ρ− (1− σ)γ) ⇔ (c
W
0 )
1−σ − (ck0)1−σ > 0
since (1− σ) is a negative number in this case. Thus, ∆ < 0 requires
(cW0 )
1−σ > (ck0)
1−σ ⇔ 1 =
(
cW0
ck0
)σ−1
which is true when ck0 > c
W
0 . Thus, it does not matter for the condition ∆ < 0 whether
σ ≷ 1.
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Lemma 6 If
n
l
<
R∗ − γ∗
η∗
, then cW∗0 < c
k∗
0 and V
W∗ < V k∗.
The relative welfare change of the two kinds of agents when efficiency changes and
policy is endogenous is given by
dV i
dA |τ∗
=
∂V i
∂A |τ∗
+
∂V i
∂τ |τ∗
dτ
dA
where i =W,k (5)
and τ∗ denotes the policy chosen in the optimum. For welfare comparisons these deriva-
tives must be checked under the optimal pro-capital policy τˆ and under the optimal policy
τˇ . I will concentrate on the optimal pro-capital policy first.
E.1 Welfare Comparison under the Optimal Pro-Capital
Policy
The optimal pro-capital policy maximizes growth and is given by τˆ . Notice that dτˆdA =
1
α [α(1−α)A]
1
α−1α(1−α) = τˆαA . Furthermore, under that policy we have Rτ = rτ −1 = 0
and γτ = 0.
I want to show that dV
W
dA |τˆ >
dV k
dA |τˆ or
dVW
dA |τˆ · 1VW > dV
k
dA |τˆ · 1V k .
Given that we contemplate the optimal pro-capital policy we can use the envelope
theorem on dV
k
dA to get
dV k
dA =
∂V k
∂A since
∂V k
∂τ = 0 in the optimum. Thus,
dVW
dA >
dV k
dA
holds if
∂VW
∂A |τˆ
+
∂VW
∂τ |τˆ
· dτˆ
dA
>
∂V k
∂A |τˆ
. (6)
We know that
∂V i
∂A |τˆ
=
(1− σ)2(ci0)−σ
(
∂ci0
∂A
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) + (1− σ)2
(
∂γ
∂A
)
(ci0)
1−σ
(1− σ)2(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2
=
(ci0)
1−σ
[(
∂ci0
∂A
1
ci0
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)]
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 .
Notice that ∂V
i
∂A > 0 under our assumption that (ρ−(1−σ)γ) > 0. For the term ∂V
W
∂τ |τˆ · dτˆdA
I obtain
∂VW
∂τ |τˆ
· dτˆ
dA
=
(1− σ)2(cW0 )−σ
(
∂cW0
∂τ
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) + (1− σ)2
(
∂γ
∂τ
)
(cW0 )
1−σ
(1− σ)2(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 ·
dτˆ
dA
=
(cW0 )
1−σ
[(
∂cW0
∂τ
1
cW0
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂τ
)]
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 ·
dτˆ
dA
.
We contemplate the optimal pro-capital policy, so γτ = 0. Thus,
∂VW
∂τ |τˆ
· dτˆ
dA
=
(cW0 )
1−σ
[(
∂cW0
∂τ
1
cW0
dτˆ
dA
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)
]
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 .
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Hence,
∂VW
∂A |τˆ
+
∂VW
∂τ |τˆ
· dτˆ
dA
=
(cW0 )
1−σ
[
Λ (ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)]
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 .
where Λ =
(
∂cW0
∂A
1
cW0
)
+
(
∂cW0
∂τ
1
cW0
dτˆ
dA
)
. As cW0 = ηk˜0 we have Λ =
ηA
η +
ητ
η
dτˆ
dA where
subscripts denote the partial derivatives.36 As η = (1− α)Aτˆ1−α and dτˆdA = τˆαA we get
Λ =
1
A
+
(1− α)2Aτˆ−α
(1− α)Aτˆ1−α
τˆ
αA
=
1
A
+
1− α
α A
=
1
αA
(7)
Furthermore, for the capitalists’ welfare we let Π ≡ ∂ck0
ck0
= RA−γAR−γ .
I will now distinguish the cases σ > 1 and σ < 1.
The Case σ > 1.
When σ > 1 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than unity.37
Now for the claimed welfare effects it must then be that
∂VW
∂A |τˆ
+
∂VW
∂τ |τˆ
· dτˆ
dA
>
∂V k
∂A
(cW0 )
1−σ
[
Λ (ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)]
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 >
(ck0)
1−σ
[
Π (ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)]
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2[
Λ (ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)]
[
Π (ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)] > ( ck0
cW0
)1−σ
(8)
As ck0 > c
W
0 and σ > 1 so that (1 − σ) < 0, the RHS of the last inequality is less than
1. Thus, a sufficient condition for the overall inequality to hold is that the LHS be bigger
than one. One easily verifies that that is the case if Λ > Π. Now
Λ > Π
1
αA
>
rA − γA
R− γ
1
α
((r − τˆ)− γ) > rA ·A− γA ·A
((r − τˆ)− γ) > α r
(
σ − 1
σ
)
(1− α) r
(
σ − 1
σ
)
+
ρ
σ
> τˆ
(
σ − 1
σ
)
(9)
36For example, ητ denotes ∂η∂τ .
37This is conventionally argued to be the empirically relevant case. See, for example, Hall
(1988). However, recent results suggest that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
rather close to unity. See, for instance, Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996).
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But at τˆ we have that (1− α)r = τˆ . This is because r = αAτˆ1−α and τˆ = [α(1− α)A] 1α .
As ρ/σ > 0 for σ <∞ we have Λ > Π. Hence, when σ > 1, the workers benefit more from
higher A than the capital owners.
Lemma 7 If σ > 1 , then
dVW
dA |τˆ
>
dV k
dA |τˆ
.
Intuitively, Lemma 7 says that the marginal change in welfare due to a change in A
is greater for the workers than for the capital owners. Thus, no matter what level welfare
of the two agents we start from, the change is bigger for the workers.
The case: σ < 1
If σ < 1, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is higher than one. People react
relatively more to differences in r and ρ, and may be quite willing to shift consumption
over time. This case is not found to represent actual behaviour very well.
To deal with the case σ < 1 under the optimal pro-capital policy we will focus on the
relative welfare changes dV
i
dA |τˆ · 1V i . This yields for a worker
dVW
dA |τˆ
· 1
VW
=
(cW0 )
1−σΛ (ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)
(cWo )
1−σ
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2
· (1− σ)(ρ− (1− σ)γ)
(cW0 )1−σ
= (1− σ)Λ + (1− σ)
∂γ
∂A
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)
For a capitalist we similarly obtain
dV k
dA |τˆ
· 1
V k
= (1− σ)Π + (1− σ)
∂γ
∂A
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)
Thus, if σ < 1 and (1 − σ) > 0, the change in welfare is greater for a worker than a
capitalist when
dVW
dA |τˆ
· 1
VW
>
dV k
dA |τˆ
· 1
V k
Λ > Π.
But this inequality holds by the same arguments which led to (9). Thus,
Lemma 8 If σ < 1, then
dVW
dA |τˆ
· 1
VW
>
dV k
dA |τˆ
· 1
V k
Hence, we can summarize our findings in
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Proposition 6 If period utility is of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
type and σ ≷ 1, where ν ≡ 1σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, then a
worker benefits relatively more from technical progress (higher A) than a capitalist under
a pro-capital policy, that is,
dVW
dA |τˆ
· 1
VW
>
dV k
dA |τˆ
· 1
V k
if σ < 1,
dVW
dA |τˆ
>
dV k
dA |τˆ
if σ > 1.
E.2 Welfare Comparison under the Optimal Pro-Labour
Policy
Under the optimal pro-labour policy a worker benefits relatively more from technical
progress if
dVW
dA |τˇ
>
dV k
dA |τˇ
or
dVW
dA |τˇ
(
1
VW
)
>
dV k
dA |τˇ
(
1
V k
)
.
We know that VW < V k by Lemma 6.
We first check whether dV
W
dA |τˇ >
dV k
dA |τˇ . Under the optimal policy we can again employ
the envelope theorem so that the condition boils down to
∂VW
∂A |τˇ
>
∂V k
∂A |τˇ
+
∂V k
∂τ |τˇ
· dτˇ
dA
For the worker we have
∂VW
∂A |τˇ
=
(1− σ)2(cW0 )−σ
(
∂cW0
∂A
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) + (1− σ)2
(
∂γ
∂A
)
(cW0 )
1−σ
(1− σ)2(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2
=
(cW0 )
1−σ
(
∂cW0
∂A · 1cW0
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)
(cW0 )
1−σ
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2
and ∂V
W
∂τ |τˇ · dτˇdA = 0 by the envelope theorem. For a capital owner we similarly obtain
∂V k
∂A |τˇ
+
∂V k
∂A |τˇ
· dτˇ
dA
=
(ck0)
1−σ
(
∂ck0
∂A · 1ck0
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂A
)
(ck0)
1−σ
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2
+
(ck0)
1−σ
(
∂ck0
∂τ · 1ck0
)
(ρ− (1− σ)γ) +
(
∂γ
∂τ
)
(ck0)
1−σ
(ρ− (1− σ)γ)2 ·
dτˇ
dA
43
The case: σ > 1
As
(
ck0
cW0
)1−σ
< 1 when σ > 1, one verifies that the welfare change for a worker is bigger
than for a capital owner if
cWA
cW0
B + γA >
ckA
ck0
B + γA +
ckτ
ck0
B
dτˇ
dA
+ γτ
dτˇ
dA
cWA
cW0
>
ckA
ck0
+
ckτ
ck0
· dτˇ
dA
+
γτ
B
dτˇ
dA
(10)
where B = (ρ− (1− σ)γ). Now
cWA
cW0
=
ηA
η
=
1
A
,
ckτ
ck0
=
Rτ − γτ
R− γ , and
ckA
ck0
=
RA − γA
R− γ ,
where R = (r − τ). Thus, the inequality in (10) becomes
1
A
>
RA − γA
R− γ +
Rτ − γτ
R− γ ·
dτˇ
dA
+
γτ
B
dτˇ
dA
. (11)
RA = rA and Rτ = (rτ − 1) < 0 evaluated at τˇ . Furthermore, rA · A = r, and one easily
verifies that B = R− γ. Thus, it must be that
1
A
>
RA − γA
R− γ +
Rτ
R− γ ·
dτˇ
dA
(12)
1 >
r − rσ +Rτ · dτˇdA ·A
R− γ
σ(R− γ) > (σ − 1)r + σ ·Rτ · dτˇ
dA
·A
σ
[
(r − τˇ)− (r − τˇ)− ρ
σ
]
> (σ − 1)r + σ ·Rτ · dτˇ
dA
·A
(σ − 1)r − (σ − 1)τˇ + ρ > (σ − 1)r + σ ·Rτ · dτˇ
dA
·A
ρ > (σ − 1)τˇ + σ ·Rτ · dτˇ
dA
·A (13)
Notice that Rτ < 0 and dτˇdA ·A > 0 so that the second term on the RHS of the inequality is
negative. However, the first term on the RHS is positive. We can then use (15) to obtain
ρ > (σ − 1)τˇ + σ ·Rτ · σ(1− α)rA
α− σ(1− α)(rτ − 1) ·A.
As rA ·A = r we get
ρ > (σ − 1)τˇ + σ ·Rτ · σ(1− α)r
α− σ(1− α)(rτ − 1) . (14)
This inequality is not easy to analyze. I have evaluated the expressions on the RHS
further, but I have not found definite conditions on the parameters which ensure that the
inequality holds when σ > 1. Furthermore, numerical simulations have revealed that for
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certain (plausible, i.e. often used by calibration exercises) constellations of (A,α, ρ) the
inequality might hold if σ is larger but not too much larger than one. Hence, for larger σ
the inequality does not hold. Thus,
Lemma 9 If σ+ > σ > 1, where σ+ denotes some threshold σ, and for a variety of
parameter values of (A,α, ρ), the workers benefit relatively more than the capital owners
under a pro-labour policy when there is technical progress and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ν is lower than unity.
If σ > σ+ > 1, then the capital owners will benefit relatively more than the workers
under a pro-labour policy, when there is technical progress and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ν is sufficiently lower than unity.
The case: σ < 1
For this case we check whether dV
W
dA |τˇ
(
1
VW
)
> dV
k
dA |τˇ
(
1
V k
)
. Now we can go through the
same first steps as for the case with σ > 1. Given the expressions for each derivative and
V i one readily verifies that for the workers to benefit relatively more it must be that (10)
must be satisfied. But that boils down to the conditions stated in (12) and so in (13).
Form the latter we immediately infer that the inequality condition is satisfied for σ < 1.
Thus,
Lemma 10 If σ < 1, then the workers will benefit relatively more than the capital owners
under a pro-labour policy, when there is technical progress and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ν is larger than unity.
Summarizing we have
Proposition 7 If period utility is of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
type and σ < 1 < σ∗, where ν ≡ 1σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
σ∗ denotes some σ not too much larger than unity, then a worker benefits relatively more
from technical progress (higher A) than a capitalist under a pro-labour policy, that is,
dVW
dA |τˆ
· 1
VW
>
dV k
dA |τˆ
· 1
V k
if σ < 1,
dVW
dA |τˆ
>
dV k
dA |τˆ
if σ∗ > σ > 1,
If period utility is of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution type and
σ > σ∗ > 1, where ν ≡ 1σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and σ∗
denotes some σ not too much larger than unity, a worker benefits relatively less from
technical progress (higher A) than a capitalist under a pro-labour policy, that is,
dVW
dA |τˆ
<
dV k
dA |τˆ
if σ > σ∗ > 1,
F Comparative Statics
As the optimal pro-capital policy is identical the one derived under logarithmic utility, the
comparative static results are the same as in the main text.
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For the optimal pro-labour policy two conditions must be checked. The first one
concerns the effect of growth on a change in A if policy is endogenous. See p. 25 in
the resubmitted paper. For dγdA > 0 we must have rA + (rτ − 1) dτˇdA > 0. Now dτˇdA =
σ(1−α)rA
α−σ(1−α)(rτ−1) . Thus,
rA + (rτ − 1) dτˇ
dA
> 0 ⇔ rA + (rτ − 1)σ(1− α)rA
α− σ(1− α)(rτ − 1) > 0.
The denominator of the second term on the LHS of the inequality is positive (see equation
(15)), whereas the numerator is negative as (rτ − 1) < 0 at τ = τˇ . Thus, the inequality
holds if
α rA − σ(1− α)(rτ − 1)rA + (rτ − 1)σ(1− α)rA > 0
α rA > 0
which is true. Hence, dγdA > 0 under the optimal pro-labour policy and utility is of the
CIES type.
The second point in relation to the results in the paper on p. 26, section 7.2, is the
question whether dΠdA |λ=0 < 0. As in the paper the condition for this is that
ατˇα−1
dτˇ
dA
αA− ατˇα < 0.
The inequality is satisfied if dτˇdA <
τˇ
αA . The latter inequality boils down to
σ(1− α)rA < τˇ
αA
[α− σ(1− α)(rτ − 1)]
σ(1− α)α r < α τˇ − σ(1− α)(rτ − 1)τˇ
σ(1− α)α r < α τˇ − σ(1− α)((1− α)r − τˇ)
σ(1− α)α r < α τˇ − σ(1− α)r + σα(1− α)r + σ(1− a)τˇ
0 < α τˇ − σ(1− α)(r − τˇ). (1)
But τˇ satisfies (14) and so
α τˇ = ρ(1− α) + σ(1− α)[r − τˇ ].
Substituting for α τˇ yields for (1)
0 < ρ(1− α) + σ(1− α)[r − τˇ ]− σ(1− α)(r − τˇ)
0 < ρ(1− α).
which is true. Hence, dΠdA |λ=0 < 0 under the optimal pro-labour policy.
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